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Abstract  
This paper discusses the economic impacts of off-hour deliveries (OHD) and builds upon the chief findings of a 
research project that tested the use of financial incentives to receivers as an alternative to freight road pricing. The 
two main modalities of OHD (i.e., staffed and unassisted) are compared to highlight the different trade-offs between 
operational cost and risk. The paper reports the results of the economic analyses conducted for both staffed and 
unassisted OHD.   
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1. Introduction and background  
In the field of freight demand management, it had been previously assumed that freight road pricing 
could be an effective tool in urban areas. However, after researching the trucking industry’s response to 
such an approach, the results indicated that this was not the case [1]. Behavioral data was collected after 
the Time of Day Pricing Implementation at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey that showed 
that only 9% of carriers were able to pass on the cordon toll costs to their customers, and that small 
percentage is comprised of industries with market power (i.e., carriers of stone/concrete, wood/lumber, 
food, electronics, and beverages) [2]. The research also showed that most carriers cannot pass the toll 
costs to their customers. Without the ability to pass on these costs, there is no price signal that reaches the 
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receivers and thus no motivation to change operations. Further research highlighted that marginal costs 
equal delivery in competitive markets. Thus, fixed costs, such as cordon tolls, cannot be included in the 
delivery rates. Further, even in the small percentage of cases where it can be passed, the cost is spread 
across all receivers in a tour with minimal impact [2]. 
It follows that, as confirmed by the behavioral research [1], the receiver is the primary decision maker, 
and thus most heavily influences delivery times. In fact, carriers were asked why their behaviors did not 
change as a result of the time of day tolls, and roughly 70% responded with “customer requirements.” 
Therefore, in order for the carriers to change operations from the regular hours to the off-hours, in an 
effort to avoid the tolls, the receivers must also agree to switch—as illustrated, there is no incentive for 
receivers to change [1]. This all shows that the carrier-centered policies are not as effective as expected, 
and policies that target receivers are needed to induce a change to the off-hours. Further behavioral 
research conducted by the authors established the effectiveness of such policies [3-4]. It must be noted 
that targeting both the receivers and the carriers is necessary to cause a large shift of truck traffic to the 
off-hours, and understanding stakeholder behaviors is essential for designing these policies. 
It has been further shown [5-6] that there are potentially substantial benefits to carriers who use off-
hours deliveries (OHD), most notably: (1) delivery costs are 20-30% cheaper than during regular hours; 
and (2) parking fines can average $500-$1000 per truck/month in New York City (NYC), which can be 
avoided during the off-hours. On the other hand, receivers who use OHD are expected to incur higher 
costs (e.g., staff, security) than during regular hours—since receivers are the key decision makers, almost 
all deliveries are made during the regular hours (e.g., 95% in NYC) [5-6]. This is a classic “Battle of the 
Sexes” game [7] that is known to have two equilibria, and in this case the receivers impose the less 
favorable solution on the carriers. In order to change the outcome, there must be an incentive given to the 
receivers either by the carriers or through the public sector. 
Although there are savings to the carriers by using OHD, these are not large enough to compensate for 
the incremental costs of the receivers [2]. Therefore, public sector intervention is necessary to persuade 
receivers to accept OHD, which is ultimately the most efficient outcome for society. By inducing this 
change and allowing carriers to conduct OHD, this would lead to: (1) a significant shift of truck traffic to 
the off-hours; (2), as a result of (1), reduced congestion and improved environmental conditions; and (3) 
higher business productivity that could enhance the competitiveness of the metropolitan area. Public 
policy incentives vary from financial incentives in exchange for OHD participation to fostering the use of 
unassisted OHD to reduce additional staff costs to public recognition for participation. The primary 
objective of the project discussed in this paper was to design and test, through a small-scale pilot test, a 
system of incentives to encourage OHD. 
When developing the pilot, there were three main components completed by the team: (1) 
identification of industry segments to participate in OHD; (2) estimation of the joint response of carriers 
and receivers to OHD policies; and (3) assessment of the network-wide impacts of different OHD policies. 
The first component used behavioral research [5-6, 8] and freight generation analyses [9] to determine the 
industry segments most inclined to participate or those with the largest payoff in terms of truck trips 
shifted, respectively. These analyses revealed that the food and retail sectors are the best targets. The 
second component of the project entailed the development of a Behavioral Micro-Simulation [10], which 
captured in a simulation system the necessary conditions for participation in OHD [2], and estimated the 
percent of carriers that would find OHD profitable if a number of receivers are interested. 
The simulation component of the design was a two-tier approach that combined models to estimate the 
traffic impacts of OHD: (1) the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council’s Best Practice Model, 
which is a macroscopic travel demand model; and (2) a mesoscopic traffic simulation (MTS) model of an 
extracted network focusing on Manhattan. It is important to study impacts at both of these levels as, even 
though most delivery trips in Manhattan originate within its limits (typically as part of a delivery tour), 
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many freight trips also originate outside of Manhattan, where the ports, depots, and other major 
generators are located. The systems developed were implemented in a pilot test that involved 33 
companies that implemented OHD for one month. The performance of the participating trucks was 
monitored with the assistance of Global Positioning System (GPS) devices. At the end of the test, 
satisfaction surveys were conducted. In the final component of the project, the team conducted economic 
analyses of various forms of OHD policies.  
This paper builds on the research conducted above [9, 11-12] with the addition of a thorough 
discussion, and preliminary economic analyses of unassisted OHD. The paper has several sections, in 
addition to the introduction. Section 2 discusses the two main modalities of OHD with an assessment of 
cost versus risk. Section 3 summarizes the pilot tests results both in terms of productivity savings and 
levels of satisfaction. Sections 4 and 5 provide an overview of the simulation results and economic 
impacts of staffed OHD, respectively. Section 6 includes a sensitivity analysis of the economic impacts of 
unassisted OHD. Section 7 discusses the policy implications, and Section 8 summarizes the paper. 
2. Modalities of off-hour deliveries (OHD) 
In general terms, there are two main modalities of off-hour deliveries (OHD): staffed OHD, and 
unassisted OHD (UOHD). In the former case, staff from the receiving establishment is present to accept 
the OHD, verify the correctness of the orders, and ensure safety and integrity of the property. This 
minimizes the risk of “something bad” happening during the off-hours (referred to here as a “negative 
outcome”), though at a significant expense in terms of staff, electricity, security, and others. As a result, 
staffed OHD could cost anywhere between $20 to $150 per hour in the off-hour period [13]. Not 
surprisingly, most receivers—except those that are open during the off-hours—refuse to do staffed OHD 
unless they are compensated for these costs. In contrast, in unassisted OHD there is no need to have staff 
present in the off-hours. This dramatically reduces the incremental direct costs to receivers, though an 
element of risk is introduced (e.g., property damage/theft could occur). In essence, staffed and UOHD 
involve different tradeoffs of direct costs and risk. The OHD systems that involve the use of staff include: 
x Staffed OHD: The staff from the receiving establishment is present when the OHD are made. This 
enables them to verify the accuracy of shipments, and ensure integrity of business and property. 
x Two stage systems: OHD to large traffic generators’ (e.g., large buildings, large manufacturers) 
delivery room, regular deliveries to consignees: The delivery room at these large traffic generators 
receives/sends OHD. From there, the deliveries to the actual consignees take place during the regular 
hours. The main advantage of these systems is that they do not require that receivers’ involvement 
with OHD. 
 
Among the UOHD alternatives, one could find: 
x Double doors: The driver is provided with a key to an outside door that leads to a small storage area 
separated from the rest of the business by a second door. This enables the driver to do UOHD without 
having access to the establishment itself. 
x Key deliveries: The driver is provided with a key to the establishment which enables the drivers to 
deposit the goods at a preset location, e.g., inside a walk-in refrigerator. 
x Key deliveries with manual/electronic key box: The driver is provided a password or security code to 
open the key box and get a key to open the establishment. The key box enables the store owner to 
control who has access to the establishment. 
x Key deliveries with manual/electronic key box and monitored by security cameras: In addition to the 
above, a security camera monitors the UOHD. 
37 JosÈ HolguÌn-Veras et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  39 ( 2012 )  34 – 46 
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l c
o
st
 
Risk 
Staffed OHD 
Key deliveries 
Electronic doorman 
Double doors 
Two stage systems 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
x Electronic doorman: A remote operator, assisted by security cameras and radio/phone, grants access to 
the establishment to authorized vendors. These systems require identification checks to ensure that 
only authorized individuals are allowed access. 
 
Qualitatively speaking, one could map the various alternatives using a Pareto frontier with cost on the 
vertical axis, and risk in the horizontal. Fig. 1 shows such a depiction in which the black circles represent 
the staffed OHD modalities, and the clear ones the UOHD alternatives.  
Fig. 1. Cost-risk tradeoffs 
The key insight is that the two modalities of OHD represent different tradeoffs between operational 
cost and risk. At one end, staffed OHD minimize the risk of a negative outcome to the receiver (e.g., theft, 
physical damage) though at a high cost (e.g., staff salaries, security). In this case, since risk ceases to be a 
factor in the decision, most rational receivers would undertake staffed OHD if a financial incentive 
compensates them for the additional costs. At the other end of the spectrum, unassisted OHD could be 
undertaken at no cost to the receiver, though an element of risk is introduced as there is no staff to prevent 
negative outcomes. The chief implication is that, in order to convince receivers to accept unassisted OHD, 
they must be presented with an adequate risk-reward proposition as they are not likely to take on that risk 
without a proper reward. 
The next sections summarize the simulation work done, and present the results of the economic 
analyses conducted. Taken together they provide a solid idea of the potential benefits associated with the 
various modalities of OHD. 
3. Pilot test results 
Three industrial partners took part in the OHD pilot test for at least a one-month period: (1) Foot 
Locker and New Deal Logistics; (2) Sysco and a sample of its customers; and (3) Whole Foods Market 
and a sample of its vendors. A total of eight carriers/vendors participated, as well as about 25 receivers 
(30 receivers if partial participation is counted)—roughly half of the receivers used unassisted deliveries 
(drivers were given store keys), and the other half had staff on-hand to accept the deliveries. The pilot 
tests were conducted independently of each other as there were no interactions between groups. Data 
from the pilot were remotely sensed using GPS-enabled. Some participants used devices provided by the 
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project, though many chose to use their own GPS equipment and then provided the project team with tour 
data. In some cases, passive GPS data loggers were used as backup. The team analyzed the data to obtain 
estimates of performance measures and compared those to base case (regular hours) productivity 
conditions. The travel speeds for customer-to-customer trip segments within Manhattan were calculated 
as space mean estimates. The average speeds reached roughly 8 mph in the 5-7AM period, but dropped as 
low as 3 mph in the day hours. The results for the service times showed a 72% decrease from the regular 
hours (1.8 hour maximum average, during the 10AM-noon period) to the off-hours (0.5 hour average 
during the late night hours).   
Although there are notable travel time savings associated with faster speeds in the off-hours, there 
stand to be major economic savings attributed to the reduction of service times. For instance, a delivery 
truck that saves 15 minutes at each of the six deliveries (about the average in New York City), will save a 
total of 1.5 hours. This will increase the profitability of delivery operations and, ultimately, lower the cost 
of the products consumed. These service times represent the time spent on a combination of tasks: 
loading/unloading the cart used to transport the cargo, walking from/to the truck to/from the customer 
location, waiting to use the freight elevators, finding the person that would accept the delivery, waiting 
for the authorized individual to review the shipment made, waiting for proper signatures and/or payment, 
sorting out any problems that arise, and other related activities. It stands to reason that a switch to not 
only OHD, but to unassisted off-hour deliveries (UOHD), could produce even greater economic benefits 
by eliminating some service delays. Aside from being able to park closer to the customer during the off-
hours and thus reducing walking time, using an unassisted system removes the middle man so there is less 
lag time waiting for shipment authorization. This does, however, increase the risk, as it is more difficult to 
address missing, damaged, or incorrect orders. This is discussed in the previous section where is it shown 
that UOHD are more favourable than staffed, despite the risk. 
The research team gathered feedback from the participants regarding their experiences during the pilot 
test. An opinion survey was used, of which there were four versions: Group 1 receiver management, 
Groups 2 and 3 receiver management, carrier management, and drivers. The pilot for Group 1 was set up 
through headquarters, and the receiver responses were deemed invalid due to miscommunication of 
incentives. All participants were asked to provide their impression of OHD and likelihood of requesting 
or receiving these again, on a scale from 1 = “Very Favorable” to 5 = “Very Unfavorable.” The results, 
shown in Fig. 2, are generally very positive especially the drivers and Group 2 receivers. All receivers 
were posed with whether or not they would partake in UOHD if liability issues were addressed, and this 
was more favorable for Group 2—these results are discussed in-depth below. Carriers were asked how 
OHD affected their costs, and there was a slight decrease mainly attributed to the reduction in parking 
violations and fuel consumption during the nighttime. The reader is referred to the project final report [9] 
for the full surveys and results. 
Following survey completion, the team conducted in-depth phone interviews with executives from two 
carriers and four receivers, and these provided more insight into the potential for UOHD. The first carrier 
mentioned some negative experiences with staffed OHD due to the receiver having a limited delivery 
window, so this reduced the number of possible stops on a route. The use of UOHD would reduce or 
potentially eliminate these concerns as the goods could be left at any time, not just one that fit into the 
schedule of re-assigned staff. The second carrier had very positive feedback regarding the pilot, and the 
majority of its receivers actually used UOHD via key deliveries. Almost all of the receivers who used 
UOHD during the pilot continued to do so after the pilot ended, even without the financial incentives, so 
the carrier was able to keep three of the four off-hour routes it created as part of the pilot. In fact, some 
locations have since changed vendors and are still using UOHD with the new company. It was indicated 
that this approach may have provided the leverage necessary to negotiate a better contract, since the 
carriers stand to benefit from OHD. 
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Note: Impression scale is from 1 = “Strongly Prefer Off-Hours” to 5 = “Strongly Prefer Regular Hours.” UOHD and Likelihood 
scales are from 1 = “Very Favourable” to 5 = “Very Unfavourable.” Costs scale is from 1 = “Moderate Decrease” to 5 = “Moderate 
Increase.” 
Fig. 2. Sample of post-pilot opinion survey results  
 Feedback from the receivers who accepted UOHD showed an interesting shift in opinions; previous to 
the pilot, there were concerns about how ordering errors would be handled, but there were very few errors 
in practice. For UOHD, the drivers were cognizant of errors and readily fixed the orders, while receivers 
using staffed OHD noted that staff had more time during these hours to careful check the merchandise 
and address any discrepancies. One carrier mentioned that the trucks that are loaded earlier have a much 
better chance of fulfilling the orders without problem, as stocks are full of supplies. After actually using 
UOHD in the field, the opinions were very positive, mainly due to the large increase in reliability—this 
was an unexpected result for both the research team and the participants. However, it must be noted that 
receivers felt comfortable using UOHD with this carrier due to its size and reputation, but would not be as 
likely to pursue this with smaller vendors. 
4. Simulation results: Staffed off-hour deliveries (OHD) 
The team used two models to estimate the traffic impacts of OHD alternatives: (1) a macroscopic 
travel demand model, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Council’s Best Practice Model (BPM); 
and (2) a mesoscopic traffic simulation (MTS) model of an extracted network focusing on Manhattan. 
The models were calibrated using the most current truck traffic volumes provided by New York-area 
transportation agencies. This allowed for an estimation of traffic impacts at the regional level; extracting a 
sub-network that concentrated on Manhattan, used in the MTS and also calibrated with acquired data, 
allowed for estimates on a local scale. As noted, the majority of the delivery trips in Manhattan do tend to 
originate within its borders; however, many freight trips also start outside of Manhattan limits, as that is 
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where the depots, ports, and other major generators are located. Once these traffic models were developed, 
the team was able to study several scenarios of potential traffic shift using tools from the behavioral 
research tasks. The goal was to simulate the changes to travel times, link speeds, and other measures that 
could be brought about through varying percentages of traffic shifts, specifically the commercial vehicles 
bound for Manhattan; a post-processor developed by Ozbay et al. [14] was used to analyze the results. 
The total travel times in segments corresponding to the links of the BPM were obtained. These results per 
link were aggregated by time period and are presented in Fig. 3 as a comparison with the BPM results for 
the three scenarios (average shifts of 2.93%, 6.90%, and 10.42%) run in both models. Additional details 
can be found at Iyer et al. [15]. 
The percent changes in the travel times are shown for the nighttime (NT) period, the combined 
daytime hours, and throughout the 24-hour day. The MTS displays far greater travel time savings during 
the daytime than the BPM, which is also the case for the 24-hour period. This indicates that the 
simulation is more sensitive to the reduced daytime traffic, and the differences in results are related to 
how the models manage traffic flows and congestion – the MTS is a more realistic method to compute 
and aggregate delays. The differences in the NT period are not significant as congestion is typically not 
an issue at these times. The path-based results were also included, and Fig.3 shows that, for the simulation, 
the link-based results are a slight overestimation of the travel time savings [9].  
Fig. 3. BPM versus sub-network comparison (Manhattan links) 
5. Economic impacts: Staffed off-hour deliveries (OHD) 
The economic impacts produced by OHD in terms of travel time savings and air pollution reductions 
were estimated using both the regional network model (BPM) and the mesoscopic traffic simulation. 
Valuations of the examined pollutants were used, and the estimates of travel time savings are based on a 
composite value of time (VOT). It was assumed that the traffic composition was: 83% passenger cars, 
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13% small trucks, 3% large trucks, and 1% buses; and the respective VOT for these vehicle classes are: 
$24 (assuming average occupancy of 1.2 passengers/vehicle), $35, $55, and $750 (including VOT for 
passengers, driver, and vehicle). This gives an average composite VOT of $33.62/vehicle-hour. For 
roadway users, the values corresponding to a composite VOT of $30/hour were considered by the 
research team to be the most likely; for delivery vehicles, the most likely values are produced by a 
composite VOT of $40/hour. More details on the analyses could be found at [12]. 
The results for the financial incentive scenario, using an assumed composite VOT of $30/hour for 
roadway users and $40/hour for delivery drivers, are summarized in Table 1. The estimates assume that 
the receiver costs are equal to the incentive cost (that is, the number of establishments receiving incentive 
times to the specified incentive amount). This conservative assumption provides the upper bound for 
receivers’ costs, which is reasonable as a receiver simply would not accept the incentive if it did not cover 
additional costs. The benefits to both roadway users and carriers increase as the OHD participation rate of 
receivers rises, yet their rate of growth decreases. As it becomes increasingly more difficult for receivers 
to participate, the overall costs—and thus the incentive costs—increase more rapidly. It is also shown that 
the benefits to the carriers are generally smaller than the costs to receivers, which is consistent with 
economic theory [2]. In essence, the market by itself cannot reach preferable social outcome, i.e., OHD, 
because the receiver costs outweigh the carrier savings. As a result, the carriers cannot cover the extra 
costs and still maintaining a benefit. This provides the justification for market intervention through public 
policies or incentives. 
Table 1. Economic analysis results 
 
The results imply that the net benefits are zero at about the $17,500/year incentive level, as the costs 
are greater than the OHD benefits beyond this mark. However, the optimal amount of incentive is the one 
for which the marginal benefit/cost ratio, or ∆B/∆C, is equal to 1. This is achieved between $10,000 (1.03) 
and $15,000 per year, which corresponds to the situation in which the percent traffic shifted to the off-
hours is 14-21% of the total truck traffic.  
These results suggest that the imposition of mandatory regulations that force OHD should be given a 
second thought. The reason is that, in spite of the fact that they do lead to travel time and pollution 
reductions, they impose a huge cost on the receivers and the urban economy. As shown in the table, the 
rapid increase in the receiver costs quickly overwhelms the other benefits associated with OHD. The 
implication is that regulatory policies that mandate OHD, such as those in place if large Chinese and 
European cities, are not likely to be optimal because of the cost they impose on the receivers of goods. 
Financial 
incentive
Market 
share
Cost to 
receivers
Benefit to 
carriers
Benefit to 
road users
Total 
benefits
Total 
Incentive 
Costs
Net benefits Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
$5,000 6.49% (16.20)        $28.72 $57.10 $85.81 ($16.20) $69.62 5.30
$10,000 14.10% (76.07)        $63.20 $84.42 $147.62 ($76.07) $71.55 1.03
$15,000 20.90% (172.91)      $93.39 $100.24 $193.63 ($172.91) $20.72 0.48
$20,000 25.34% (284.13)      $113.23 $146.15 $259.38 ($284.13) ($24.75) 0.59
$25,000 29.07% (413.72)      $129.93 $173.24 $303.17 ($413.72) ($110.55) 0.34
$50,000 41.65% (1,244.39)   $188.26 $206.49 $394.75 ($1,244.39) ($849.64) 0.11
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6. Economic impacts: Unassisted off-hour deliveries (UOHD) 
The economic analyses of UOHD are hampered by the lack of data about the market share that the 
various forms of UOHD could capture. For that reason, in order to produce some basic estimates a 
number of basic assumptions are made. The first one is that the receivers that agree to participate in 
staffed OHD would be willing to accept other combinations of cost-risk if they are adequately 
compensated for any negative outcome that could happen during UOHD. The second assumption is that 
the economic consequence of a negative outcome during OHD is proportional to the incentive required 
for the receiver to agree to staffed OHD. The third assumption is that the negative outcomes are random 
events that happen with a given probability. Given the uncertainty about these assumptions, the authors 
complement them with sensitivity analyses on: the proportion of the financial incentive that corresponds 
to the economic cost of negative outcome, and the probability of such outcome to occur. In this context, 
the authors use two different values of the cost of a negative outcome as a proportion of the incentive 
amount: 10%, and 30%; and four different values of the probability of a negative outcome in a given year: 
25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% (which implies that all receivers file a claim every year). Table 2 shows the 
estimates of the economic costs (per receiver) if a negative outcome happens during the off-hours. 
 
Table 2. Cost of a negative outcome 
 
The figures in Table 2, though smaller than the corresponding financial incentives, are not negligible 
either particularly taking into account the large number of receivers in a large urban area like Manhattan, 
where even a small probability of negative outcome could lead to large number of establishments seeking 
compensation. This suggests that the key to a successful UOHD strategy is to achieve the lowest values 
possible of the probability of a negative outcome. This will likely necessitate, in addition to significant 
efforts on driver training, the installation of security devices (e.g., cameras) to protect the establishment’s 
property, and to reduce the possibility of false claims. Nevertheless, to illustrate the potential economic 
impacts of UOHD, the authors recomputed the economic analysis in Table 1 or three different scenarios 
of probability of negative outcomes, assuming that the economic cost of a negative outcome is 20% of the 
financial incentive required for the receiver to accept UOHD. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the sensitivity analyses on the net benefits and the marginal benefit to 
cost ratios. The results clearly indicate the potential of UHOD as a tool to reduce the congestion produced 
by urban freight activity. As shown in the results, UOHD always perform better than staffed  of the 
receiver costs); in UOHD, the optimal amount of participation significantly increases—as the receivers 
would not be required to have staff present to accept the deliveries. In essence, UOHD enables the urban 
areas to reap the benefits of OHD; at a much reduced cost. The results are also quite robust. As shown in 
Table 3, even if one assume that the cost of a negative outcome is 30% of the financial incentive; and that  
10% 20% 30%
$5,000 $500.00 $1,000.00 $1,500.00
$10,000 $1,000.00 $2,000.00 $3,000.00
$15,000 $1,500.00 $3,000.00 $4,500.00
$20,000 $2,000.00 $4,000.00 $6,000.00
$25,000 $2,500.00 $5,000.00 $7,500.00
$50,000 $5,000.00 $10,000.00 $15,000.00
Cost of a negative outcome
Financial 
incentive
43 JosÈ HolguÌn-Veras et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  39 ( 2012 )  34 – 46 
Table 3 Economic analysis results (Cost of a negative outcome = 10%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Economic analysis results (Cost of a negative outcome = 30%) 
Cost of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
10% 25% 50%
$500 6.49% $85.81 ($0.40) $85.41 211.95 ($0.81) $85.00 105.97
$1,000 14.10% $147.62 ($1.90) $145.72 41.29 ($3.80) $143.82 20.64
$1,500 20.90% $193.63 ($4.32) $189.31 19.01 ($8.65) $184.99 9.50
$2,000 25.34% $259.38 ($7.10) $252.28 23.65 ($14.21) $245.18 11.82
$2,500 29.07% $303.17 ($10.34) $292.83 13.52 ($20.69) $282.49 6.76
$5,000 41.65% $394.75 ($31.11) $363.64 4.41 ($62.22) $332.53 2.20
Cost of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
10% 75% 100%
$500 6.49% $85.81 ($1.21) $84.60 70.65 ($1.62) $84.19 52.99
$1,000 14.10% $147.62 ($5.71) $141.91 13.76 ($7.61) $140.01 10.32
$1,500 20.90% $193.63 ($12.97) $180.66 6.34 ($17.29) $176.34 4.75
$2,000 25.34% $259.38 ($21.31) $238.07 7.88 ($28.41) $230.97 5.91
$2,500 29.07% $303.17 ($31.03) $272.14 4.51 ($41.37) $261.80 3.38
$5,000 41.65% $394.75 ($93.33) $301.42 1.47 ($124.44) $270.31 1.10
Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
Market 
share
Total 
benefits Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
Market 
share
Total 
benefits Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C) Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
Cost of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
30% 25% 50%
$1,500 6.49% $85.81 ($1.21) $84.60 70.65 ($2.43) $83.38 35.32
$3,000 14.10% $147.62 ($5.71) $141.91 13.76 ($11.41) $136.21 6.88
$4,500 20.90% $193.63 ($12.97) $180.66 6.34 ($25.94) $167.70 3.17
$6,000 25.34% $259.38 ($21.31) $238.07 7.88 ($42.62) $216.76 3.94
$7,500 29.07% $303.17 ($31.03) $272.14 4.51 ($62.06) $241.11 2.25
$15,000 41.65% $394.75 ($93.33) $301.42 1.47 ($186.66) $208.09 0.73
Cost of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
Prob.of 
negative 
outcome:
30% 75% 100%
$1,500 6.49% $85.81 ($3.64) $82.17 23.55 ($4.86) $80.95 17.66
$3,000 14.10% $147.62 ($17.12) $130.50 4.59 ($22.82) $124.80 3.44
$4,500 20.90% $193.63 ($38.90) $154.73 2.11 ($51.87) $141.76 1.58
$6,000 25.34% $259.38 ($63.93) $195.45 2.63 ($85.24) $174.14 1.97
$7,500 29.07% $303.17 ($93.09) $210.09 1.50 ($124.12) $179.06 1.13
$15,000 41.65% $394.75 ($279.99) $114.76 0.49 ($373.32) $21.43 0.37
Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
Market 
share
Total 
benefits Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
Market 
share
Total 
benefits Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C) Net benefits
Marginal 
B/C ('B/'C)
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all receivers file a claim for that amount every year, UOHD outperforms the staffed OHD. In cases where 
the probability of a negative outcome is lower than 25% (not shown for space reasons), the optimal 
amount of OHD approaches 100%. 
7.  Policy implications 
Fostering the use of unassisted off-hour deliveries (UOHD) requires the identification of the various 
ways to conduct UOHD, i.e., operational concepts, and the policies that the public sector could put in 
place to foster their use. The explicit consideration of policies is necessary because, as amply 
demonstrated by the pilot test, they play a crucial role in overcoming the reluctance of receivers to 
participate in off-hour deliveries. In essence, without policies that encourage receivers to accept UOHD, 
this practice would not be embraced by a meaningful portion of receivers (otherwise, they would have 
implemented OHD already on their own). The experience of one of the participants in the pilot test is 
quite illustrative. For a number of years, the carrier has offered to install key boxes at the locations of 
willing customers (at the carrier’s expense) to enable drivers to conduct UOHD. In spite of the carrier’s 
efforts, receivers remained uninterested and only one night route was created. However, in response to the 
financial incentive offered by this project, three night routes were created in a matter of weeks. This 
example shows that receivers must perceive a real benefit to them to be willing to undertake UHOD. As a 
result, the success of an UOHD implementation depends on how adequate the UOHD operational 
concepts are to the needs and constraints of the participants, and how effective the policies are to induce 
the desire change in delivery practices. Some of the potential ways that the public sector could foster 
OHD discussed here (not mutually exclusive as there may be a need to use them in combination) include: 
x Financial incentives for participation in OHD: A monetary incentive in the form of a tax deduction, or 
any other modality, is provided to the receivers of OHD. The financial incentive lasts for as long as the 
business participates in the program. 
x Financial incentives for installation of security equipment to accept UOHD: Receivers are provided 
with a financial incentive to pay for, or offset the cost of, security devices, or enabling equipment (like 
walk-in refrigerators, to receivers that commit to accept OHD for a minimum period of time. 
x Bonded OHD and other insurance based policies: These systems are intended to protect receivers from 
accidental damage produced during OHD. The main intent is to mitigate receivers’ concerns about 
problems caused by OHD. This type of program could be administered by the insurance sector in 
combination with one of the motor truck associations in the New York and New Jersey area. 
x Establishment of an insurance fund to reimburse those suffering damage and/or theft: This provides an 
additional layer of protection to concerned receivers. 
x Non-monetary incentives: This includes the use of tools like curb management, changes in traffic 
ordinance, public acknowledgment of participation in the OHD program, provide preferential parking 
to companies that have shown commitment to sustainable delivery practices, among others.   
 
It is important to recognize that it is natural for receivers to be concerned about the things that could go 
wrong with UOHD. Rather than ignoring such valid concerns, they should be properly addressed via a 
sound combination of operational concepts and supporting policies. The key is to recognize that there is 
no single approach that would work for all because of the profound heterogeneity of business practices, in 
which each industry sector has different security needs, operational practices, and business cultures. For 
that reason, it is important to provide a menu of alternatives as wide as practically possible so that 
potential participants choose the one that fits them the best (including the option of not participating).  
In addition, there may be a need to implement policies to mitigate the noise impacts on local 
communities. Examples of such policies include: 
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x Definition of the maximum noise threshold to conduct OHD: Carriers doing OHD would be required 
not to exceed a pre-set noise level during the OH. 
x Requirements to use low noise truck technology: The participating carriers will be required to both 
train their drivers to minimize noise, and to use low-noise trucks to minimize community impacts. 
x Requirements to use electric trucks: Since electric trucks produce almost no noise, their use in the off-
hours will eliminate noise impacts on local communities, and at the same time, bring about significant 
environmental savings in terms of energy and pollution. 
 
It is important to mention that, on the basis of informal conversations with the carriers, the authors 
believe that they would be willing to purchase low noise technology, and even electric trucks, if there is a 
sustained public sector commitment to OHD. In their opinion, if the carriers are convinced that public 
sector support for OHD will be there for a meaningful amount of time—that enables them to recoup the 
initial investment—they would be inclined to acquire environmentally friendly technologies. Furthermore, 
providing additional incentives to the purchase of these technologies by acting in combination with the 
cost savings associated with OHD, could make it even easier for the carriers to embrace these 
technologies. 
8. Conclusions 
The analyses conducted in the paper indicate that a full implementation of an OHD program could 
bring about substantial economic benefits. Depending on the extent of the implementation, the gross 
benefits are in the range of $147-$193 million per year, which are associated with productivity increases 
to the freight industry and travel time and environmental pollution savings. The travel time savings to be 
enjoyed by the regular hour travellers are substantial as they amount to 6% travel time reductions during 
the peak hour in Manhattan, and 4% net reductions once the increase in travel time during off-hours is 
considered. However, the magnitude of the net benefits depends on the modality of OHD that is used. In 
staffed OHD, since the cost to receivers are substantial, and require compensation, the optimal amount of 
participation is relatively small, i.e., 14-21%. In contrast, unassisted OHD—where the cost to receivers 
are much lower—lead to much larger values of the optimal participation that range between 40% and 
100%. It is clear that unassisted OHD provide a unique opportunity to achieve the benefits attributable to 
financial incentives, at a fraction of the cost. In this context, public sector programs that successfully 
address the liability issues that deter businesses from doing unassisted OHD will increase off-hour 
activity. Over time, as the business sector gets accustomed to unassisted OHD, more establishments will 
join the practice. As an illustration of the potential of UOHD, it suffices to mention that 90% of the 
receivers that tried UOHD have continued to the practice even after the incentives ended; and that 80% of 
the receivers indicated that they would do unassisted OHD if the liability issues were resolved. 
However, in spite of the concept’s great promise there are a number of important questions that need to 
be answered before a full implementation, most notably, the noise impacts on surrounding communities. 
Although no complaints were received during the execution of the small pilot test, it is natural to expect 
that community members would be concerned about noise impacts. In this context, it is important to both 
assess noise impacts, and define appropriate mitigation procedures to ensure that local communities are 
not negatively impacted. In this context, requiring the use of low noise and/or electric trucks could help 
mitigate the noise impacts thus removing the only negative of OHD. The feedback received from the 
carriers that participated in the test indicates that they would be willing to purchase these community-
friendly technologies if public sector support for OHD is there for a meaningful amount of time. 
Providing additional incentives to purchase environmentally friendly technologies could also boost this 
transition towards these technologies. 
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In essence, the research concludes has clearly and unambiguously established that OHD policy: (1) is 
effective in inducing a shift of urban deliveries to the off-hours; (2) enjoys broad based industry support; 
(3) would bring about substantial reductions in congestion and environmental pollution thus increasing 
quality of life; and (4) would increase the competitiveness of the urban economy. The fact that this is win-
win-win concept that benefits all the participants in urban deliveries provides a unique opportunity for 
expansion and full implementation that should not be missed. 
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